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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
on the level of capital gains realizations and tax revenue under
a variety of behavioral assumptions. Independent investigations
by Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, the Department of Treasury,
Lindsey, Auten and Clotfelter, and Minarijc, all point to a
large, though highly variable, amount of response by taxpayers
to changes in capital gains tax rates. The econometric results
of each of these papers are reparameterized for use in the
National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model. A total of
13 sets of behavioral assumptions are modelled.
The results show that the capital gains tax rate increase in
the new tax bill is unlikely to produce an increase in capital
gains tax revenue, Of the 13 simulations run, 12 produce lower
tax revenue over the period of 5 fiscal years being simulated.
The final simulation suggests a virtually unchanged level of
revenue. Two of the models predict extremely large levels of
capital gains realizations in late 1986 in anticipation of the
tax rate increases in the co.ing years. In none of the
simulations is any significant increase in the permanent level
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 enacted the largest capital gains
tax rate increase in history. For the first time since 1922.
the tax treatment of long term capital gains became the same as
the tax treatment of ordinary income. During the intervening 65
years, capital gains were either taxed separately from ordinary
income under an "alternative" tax or received a partial
exclusion from tax under the regular rate schedule. The end of
special treatment for long term capital gains means that the
average tax rate faced by capital gains recipients will more
than double from 9 percent under the old tax law to 21 percent
under the new tax law.
Although it is clear that the tax rate on capital gains will
rise substantially, there is controversy regarding the expected
level of capital gains tax revenue. The realization and
taxation of accrued capital gains occurs largely at the
discretion of the taxpayer. Faced with higher tax rates,
taxpayers may elect to realize gains less frequently than they,
otherwise would have. This reduced rate of realization could
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causetotal capital gains taxes collected to be lower at higher
tax rates than at lower tax rates.
Substantial econometric research has been done to estimate
the responsiveness of capital gains realizations to tax rates.
This paper considers the results of five of these studies and
the implication of these findings for capital gains taxrevenue
under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The new tax law and its
resulting effect on taxpayer behavior is simulated for the
period 1986-1991. The simulation results produce arange for
the expected level of capital gains tax revenue given thescope
of academic investigations of taxpayer behavior to date. This
range of expected revenue is then contrasted with the official
revenue estimates by the Department of Treasury and the Joint
Committee on Taxation.
It is important to note that the capital gains tax rate
increases in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are outside the realm of
historic experience. The research results of other authors used
in this paper are based on far more modest capital gains tax
rate variations than the one being simulated. The simulation
results presented here should therefore not be interpreted as a
test of the findings of earlier authors. Instead, the results
presented here are an extrapolation of earlier findings to a
larger and more general scale. The simulation results presented
here show what would happen if taxpayers respond to major tax—— 3——
changesin proportion to the way they have already responded to
comparatively smaller tax rate variations.
The first section of this paper describes the effects of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 on capital gains marginal tax rates. The
second section reviews the academic literature on the effect of
captial gains taxes on capital gains realizations and tax
revenue. The method used for adapting these research results to
the simulations done in this paper is discussed. The final
section presents the simulated effect of the new tax law on the
level of capital gains realizations and the amount of capital
gains tax revenue collected. These results show the effects of
both permanent and transitory tax rate changes and are presented
both in aggregate terms and by income class. The realizations
and revenue are generally computed on a calendar year basis, but
are converted to fiscal year basis for comparison with work done
at the Department of Treasury and the Joint Committee on
Taxation.
I. Tax Reform and the Marginal Tax Rate on Capital Gains
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provided for the elimination of
the distinction between long term capital gains and ordinary
income. Under the previous tax law, 60 percent of capital gains
on assets held at least six months were excluded fro. taxable
income. Thus, the •arginal tax rate on capital gains was only
40 percent of the marginal tax rate on other forms of income.—— 4--
Twoexceptions to this rule existed under the previous tax
law. First, the 60 percent exclusion only applied to netlong
term capital gains in excess of any short term losses. The
taxpayer netted long term gains and long term losses and
separately netted short term gains and short term losses. Then,
any short term losses were applied dollar for dollar against
long term gains. The 60 percent exclusion applied only toany
net long term gain in excess of any short term loss. The effect
of this was to subject any taxpayer with short term losses in
excess of long term gains to a long term capital gains tax rate
equal to his ordinary tax rate. In addition, any taxpayer with
large amounts of capital losses could realize long term capital
gains with no current tax liability, and only a heavily
discounted future tax liability. Poterba (1985) found these
exceptions to be limited to a relatively small minority of
capital gains recipients.
The second exception to the 60 percent exclusion rule
involved the minimum tax, The excluded portion of capital gains
was treated as a preference for income tax purposes. Tax
preferences were added to the taxpayer's ordinary taxable income
and a minimum tax was imposed on the resulting base at a rate of
20 percent. The effect of this was to subject minimum
taxpayers to a tax rate of 20 percent on capital gains
regardless of their ordinary tax rates.
The simulations in the present study are limited to
taxpayers with net long term capital gains, thus eliminating the
problems of netting long term gains and losses. The standard—- 5-—
rulesregarding long term gains and short term losses are
applied in determining the taxpayer's tax liability and the
minimum tax provisions are carefully modelled and reflected in
the taxpayer's behavior.
Under the new tax law, these distinctions were eliminated.
Taxpayers would treat their capital gains income as other
income. The only exception to this treatment occurs in 1987
when the tax rate on capital gains is limited to 28 percent.
These changes dramatically raise the marginal tax rate on
capital gains for all taxpayers.
Table 1 shows the effect of the tax reform act on capital
gains tax rates by income class. The table shows that taxpayers
with incomes under $30,000 will generally see a tripling of
their capital gains tax rates. Taxpayers with incomes between
$30,000 and $200,000 will see their marginal tax rates on
capital gains double. Those taxpayers earning over $200,000
will see an increase in tax rates of about 75 percent. The
average marginal tax rate faced by all recipients of long term
capital gains will more than double under the new law from 9.2
percent to more than 21 percent. Taken as a whole, these
changes represent the largest capital gains tax rate increase;
since at least 1934, and probably since the advent of income
taxation in 1913.
Various provisions of the new law are phased in over the
period 1987-1991. The effect of these on the capital gains tax
rate is also evident from Table 1. The tax rate schedule is
changed between 1987 and 1988. The primary beneficiaries of—— 6——
TableI
Capital Gains Tax Rates by Income Class
Income Old New Law
Class Law 1987 1988 1989—1991
under 10 1.4% 5.6% 6,0% 4.5%
10 —20 4.7 14.6 14.8 14.3
20 —30 6.9 18.2 17.5 17.3
30 —50 9.3 22.4 21.4 20.7
50 —75 12.2 27.2 27.6 27.4
75 —100 14.3 27.7 29.8 29.0
100 —200 15.1 27.8 32.0 32.1
over 200 16.1 27.1 27.8 28.4
All Capital
Gains Taxpayers 9.2 20.5 21.1 21.5—— 7——
thisare taxpayers earning between $20,000 and $50,000 who
benefit from an increase in the threshold for the 28 percent tax
bracket. Taxpayers earning between $75,000 and $200,000 will
generally see an increase in their capital gains tax rate
because a new 33 percent rate bracket takes effect in that
income range. Changes after 1988 generally make the tax code
more progressive as passive losses are phased out and the
personal exemption is raised,
It is useful to put these marginal tax rate increases into
the perspective of recent tax rate changes. Lindsey (1986a)
carefully measured the effective marginal tax rates for various
income classes for the period 1965—1982. Experiments with the
capital gains tax rate over that period were common with a
change in the law occurring, on average, every other year.In
the case of taxpayers earning under $50,000, who comprise a
majority of capital gains recipients, the variation in tax rates
was quite small. Over that 18 year period, the average marginal
tax rate on capital gains for these taxpayers varied between a
high of 13.8 percent in 1969 and a low of 10.6 percent in 1979.
Thus, for the vast majority of capital gains recipients, tax
rate changes of the •agnitude imposed by the tax reform act are
unobservable.
Taxpayers in higher income classes saw much more variation
in their tax rates, although still less than that contemplated
in the recent tax reform. The largest capital gains tax rate
change for any income group in this 18 year period occurred
between 1978 and 1979. The excluded portion of capital gains—— 8——
wasincreased from 50 percent to 60 percent beginning in
November, 1978, and various minimum tax and maximum tax
provisions were changed which substantially lowered themarginal
tax rate on capital gains for upper income taxpayers.Taxpayers
with incomes over $1,000,000 saw their capital gains taxrate
fall from an average 39.1 percent to 26.9 percent. Taxpayers
earning between $100,000 and $1,000,000 saw a tax rate decline
of roughly 10 percentage points. Thus, even the largestcapital
gains tax rate change in recent history is smaller than the tax
rate change which will take effect under the new tax law.
The problems of estimating the effect of a tax change which
is out of the realm of historic experience are great. There is
no assurance that taxpayer response to a large tax change is of
a magnitude proportional to the response of a much smaller tax
change. Furthermore, the major variation in tax rates in the
past occurred for upper income individuals.It is not certain
that taxpayers in lower income brackets will respond to tax rate
changes of large magnitudes the way upper income taxpayers
responded to large tax changes in the past. In addition, the
studies of the past were based on a tax regime which is
substantially different from the one recently enacted. There is
no guarantee that behavioral parameters estimated under a
substantially different choice set for taxpayers can be extended
to the new tax regime. The behavior of taxpayers in the past
should therefore be taken only as a guide to the kinds of
responses we might expect in the future.—— 9——
II.Research on the Sensitivity of Capital Gains to Tax Rates
The sensitivity of capital gains realizations to tax rules
can take many forms. The existence of a specific capital gains
holding period, after which tax treatment changes, induces
taxpayer distortions in the timing of asset sales around that
period. Kaplan (1981) found this distortion to be significant
enough to suggest that eliminating the holding period and taxing
all capital gains at the lower long term tax rates would enhance
capital gains tax revenue. Fredland, Gray, and Sunley (1968)
also found that the length of the holding period had a
signficant effect on the timing of asset sales.
Assets held until death or contributed to charity escape
capital gains taxation under the income tax.In the case of
deferral of capital gains for the life of the taxpayer, the
value or basis of the property is stepped up to the fair market
value at the time of death without incurring capital gains tax.
David (1968) and Bailey (1969) have argued that eliminating
these provisions would be an efficient means of reducing the
lock—in effect by eli.inating the possibility of escaping the
capital gains tax by passing along the accrued capital gains to
ones' heirs.
The present paper neglects these issues as substantial
change was not •ade in the provisions which step up basis at
death. However, the tax reform bill did enact provisions which
might tend to limit the scope for capital gains tax avoidance.
The appreciated portion of gifts of property to charitable
organizations was made a preference under the minimum tax, thus-- 10
raising the cost of making contributions ofproperty rather than
selling the asset. A much toughened generationskipping
provision was added to the inheritance tax which reducedthe
advantages of stepped up basis at death. While thesechanges
will tend to enhance tax revenue, theyare generally tangential
to the major effect of capital gains taxeson asset sales and
capital gains tax revenue.
The central issue of academic investigationon the effect of
capital gains taxes has involved the so—called "lock—in"
effect. The deferral of taxes on capital gainsuntil
realization enhances the incentive to postponeselling assets.
A taxpayer might defer selling one asset andpurchasing another
with a higher pre-tax rate of return because thecapital gains
tax on the asset sale makes the exchange of assets
unprofitable. Brannon (1974) found evidence of reduced
realizations of capital gains as a result of tax rateincreases
in 1970 and 1971.A lock—in effect was also identified by Auten
(1979) in work done at the Department of Treasury.Feldstein
and Yitzhaki (1978) found substantial evidence thatthe sale of
corporate stock is very sensitive to individual differences in
capital gains tax rates. The present paper examines five
studies of this issue. Each study producedparameter estimates
of the effect of tax rates on the realizations ofcapital
gains. We consider them in descending order of themagnitude of
the effect they reported.
Feldstein, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1980) used the 1973
Individual Tax Model File compiled by the Internal Revenue—— 11——
Service.This data base is a stratified random sample of
roughly 100.000 tax returns with detailed information on the
income and deductions of each taxpayer. All taxpayers with
Adjusted Gross Incomes over $200,000 are included in the
sample. The 1973 tax file contains additional information on
capital gains not usually reported, including the purchase
price, date acquired, sale price, date sold, and type of asset.
Feldstein, Slerrod, and Yitzhaki limited their study to sales of
corporate stock,
The authors selected the 27,832 tax returns from the file
which reported receiving at least $3,000 of dividends in 1973,
and which accounted for 79 percent of the dividends received
that year. Dividends were used as an indicator of the value of
each taxpayer's portfolio. As the dividend yield on the
Standard and Poor's 500 was roughly 3 percent, a minimum
portfolio of $100,000 was implied. The results of their
analysis are expressed by equation 1:
(1) LTG/DIV =35.0-49.7TAX+ 0.18 AGE65 -1.23LOG(DIV)
—0.50 L0G(AGI)
The coefficient on the tax parameter implies that a 1
percentage point increase in the capital gains tax rate would
lower the ratio of long ter• gains to dividends by 0.497.
Taking the average gains to dividends ratio from the sample of
3.5, a 1 percentage point increase in the tax rate would reduce
the ratio of gains to dividends to roughly 3.0, a decline of—— 12——
about14 percent. Extending this result to a much larger
capital gains tax rate increase of 7 percentage points, implies
that the average taxpayer would cease reportingany capital
gains. Tax rate increases of more than 7 percentage points
would place the taxpayer in the corner solution of zero net
realizations.
This is not an implausible result at the individual level.
Assume for the sake of argument that accrued capital gains
represent one half of the value of the taxpayer's portfolio of
common stock and that the dividend yield is 3 percent of the
value of the portfolio. In that case, a ratio of realized gains
to dividends of 3.5 implies that the taxpayer sells about 21
percent of his portfolio during the year. This hardly signifies
an active trader of securities. An increase in the capital
gains tax rate from 26.4 (the average reported) to 33.4 might
easily induce the investor to sit and collect dividends rather
than trade his securities.
In fact, a tax rate increase of 7 percentage points from
26.4 percent to 33.4 percent covered most of the range of
capital gains taxation in the year studied.In the context of
the 1973 tax law, a 26.4 percent capital gains tax rate was
typical for someone earning $75,000 while a 33.4 percent rate
was typical for someone with total income of $500,000. The
problems of extrapolating the Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki
result therefore become apparent.
For purposes of simulating the effect of the Tax Reform Act,
this parameterization can easily produce extreme results. The
average tax rate increase of 12 percentage points in the new—— 13——
billexceeds the entire spectrum of capital gains tax rates for
the Feldstein, Slesrod, and Yitzhaki sample. Applying these
results as specified to the new bill suggests a decline in
realizations of about 90 percent.
Instead, the result was reinterpretted in terms of an
alternative specification of taxpayer behavior. This
alternative specification is given by equation 2:
(2) L0G(LTG) =A+bLOG(l —MTR)
In this specification, the taxpayer responds, with constant
elasticity, to the proportion of the long term gain which he can
keep after tax. MTR represents the taxpayer's marginal tax rate
on capital gains. A one percent increase in the share which the
taxpayer keeps after—tax will induce a "b" percent increase in
long term gains realizations.
At the mean tax rate for the sample. 26.4 percent, the after
tax share is 0.736. A one percent increase in the after—tax
share would require a cut in the capital gains tax rate of
0.00736, or 0.736 percentage points. Such a change in the tax
rate in the Feldstein, Sle.rod and Yitzhaki model would cause;
the mean gains to dividend ratio to fall from 3.50 to 3.13, or
by 10.5 percent. The Feldstein, Sle•rod and Yitzhaki result can
therefore be expressed in equation 2 with a value for "b" of
10.5.
A second study of the effect of capital gains taxes on the
realization of capital gains was done by the Office of Tax-— 14——
Analysisat the Department of Treasury. Treasury(1985) used a
panel of 17,000 taxpayers for theyears 1971 —1975.The
multi—year analysis permitted the Treasury todecompose taxpayer
response into permanent and transitory components. A numberof
par&metric specifications were performed. Theone selected by
Treasury for simulation work is expressed byequation 3.
(3) LOG(LTG) =A14.216 TXP —29.522TXP0.5 —26.289fliT
In this case, TXP represents the "permanent" taxrate of the
taxpayer which is defined as the average of the current and
prior two year's tax rates. TXT is the "transitory"rate which
its defined as the difference between the currenttax rate and
the permanent tax rate. The intercept term "A"reflects the
effect of other variables.
As in the case of the Feldstein study, theTreasury result
was estimated for a period when tax rate variationswere far
smaller than that contemplated under current tax law.Direct
application of the parameters presented in theTreasury study
produces extreme changes in the amount of gains realized.For
example, a change in the permanent tax rate on capitalgains
from 15 percent to 28 percent would imply a 90percent reduction
in capital gains realizations.
The Treasury result is reparameterized in terms ofthe
functional form given by equation 2.The reparameterization is
computed assuming a weighted average marginal tax rate for 1986
under old law ——14.7percent.In this case, the elasticity—— 15——
withrespect to permanent after tax shares is 7.49. The
elasticity with respect to the actual after tax share relative
to the permanent after tax share is 8.20.
The third study considered is Lindsey (1986a). Thisstudy
used data from the Statistics of Income for the period 1965—1982
to carefully estimate the average marginal tax rate faced by
capital gains recipients. Values were computed for six income
classes: under $50,000, $50,000 —$100,000,$100,000 —$200,000,
$200,000 —$500,000,$500,000 —$1,000,000,and over $1,000,000,
The wealth held by each of these income classes was calculated
for each year using the Federal Reserve Board's Flow of Funds
data and the income from different assets reported by each
income group on their tax returns. Assets were divided into two
classes: tradeable and non—tradeable. The former included
corporate equities, real estate, and equity in non—corporate
businesses. The latter included other types of wealth which
generally are not sold to incur capital gains such as checking
accounts and pension wealth,
Lindsey also decomposed tax rate effects into permanent and
transitory components. While a number of functional forms were
tried, the form expressed by equation 4 was selected for use in
this study:
(4) L0G(LTG) A —5.391TAX —3.027DTAX
In this case, TAX is the •arginal tax rate on capital gains
faced by the taxpayer group in the current year and DTAX is the
change in the tax rate from the preceding year.—— 16——
Theresults are expressed in a semi—elasticity form.Again,
the variation in tax rates over the period studiedwas small
relative to the changes being contemplated in the Tax ReformAct
of 1986. A 13 percentage point rise in thecapital gains tax
rate ——from15 percent to 28 percent ——wouldcause a decline
in capital gains of more than two thirds. These resultswere
reparameterized in terms of equation 2 at the old law mean
marginal tax rate of 14.7 percent. The elasticity of gains with
respect to permanent after—tax shares was computed as 4.70 while
the elasticity of gains with respect to current relative to
permanent after—tax shares was computed as 2.61.
The fourth study evaluated in the present paper was Auten
and Clotfelter (1982). They used the U.S. Treasury Department's
Seven—Year Panel of Taxpayers, which consisted of tax returns
for a random sample of taxpayers between 1967 and 1973. This
data set permitted evaluation of the difference between
permanent and transitory effects in taxpayer realization
decisions. As in the Treasury study, the permanent marginal tax
rate was defined as the average of the current and prior two
years' marginal tax rates. The transitory component was the
difference between the actual and permanent tax rates. Four
specifications were reported. This paper used the specification
which produced a statistically significant tax parameter for the
realization of long term gains. It is presented in equation 5.
(5) LTG/INCOME =A—1.81PIP -4.11MT—— 17——
theregression was performed using a Tobit procedure in
order to account for the large number of zero entries for gains
in the sample. In this case, the derivative of theexpected
value of the dependent variable with respect to the tax rate is
the Tobit coefficient times the predicted probability that the
taxpayer had capital gains. That probability was 0.287. The
mean value of the dependent variable was .123.
In order to be consistent with the other results, these
variables were reparameterized in terms of equation 2.the
results imply an elasticity with respect to permanent after—tax
shares of 3.67 and an elasticity of the actual to permanent
after—tax share of 8.55.
The final study considered is Minarik (1981). This study
was primarily a reexamination of the Feldstein results using a
different functional form and using a weighted least squares
regression technique rather than anunweighted technique. The
Minarik regressions involved a number of interaction ter.s
involving the taxpayer's tax rate which makes a direct
repara.eterization of the regression result difficult without
more data. However, the author reports an elasticity of long
term gains with respect to the tax rate of —0.44.If this -
elasticityis evaluated at the weighted average marginal tax
rate of 14.7 percent, the resulting elasticity of gains with
respect to after—tax shares becomes 2.55. Stated differently,
this result implies a sensitivity of gains to after tax shares
of about one fourth that implied by Feldstein.—— 18——
Table2
Behavioral Assumptions and Revenue Maximizing Tax Rates
Econometric Elasticity of Gains Implied Rev.
Investigation to After—Tax Share Max. Rate
Feldstein, Siemrod
and Yitzhaki 10.50 penn. 9%
Treasury Report on
1978 Tax Cuts 7.49 perm. 12%
8.20 trans.
Lindsey 4.70 perm. 18%
2.61 trans.
Auten—Clotfelter 3.67 perm. 21%
8.55 trans.
Minarik 2.55 penn. 28%—— 19—-
Table2 summarizes the results of the five studies. For
each study the elasticity of capital gains with respect to after
tax shares is reported. Where applicable, this elasticity is
decomposed into permanent and transitory components. The table
also reports an implied revenue maximizing capital gainstax
rate. This rate is equal to 1/(l+b) where "b" is the elasticity
with respect to permanent after—tax shares. This revenue
maximizing capital gains tax rate should be interpreted subject
to some qualifications. The revenue maximizing rate assumes
that there are no interactions between the capital gains tax and
the ordinary income tax and that all capital gains are taxed,
without exclusion and without variation, at the revenue
maximizing rate.
The wide variation in the results of these econometric
investigations suggests that the response of taxpayers to
changes in the capital gains tax rate is largely an unresolved
question. Nonetheless, these results produce a range within
which the true response of taxpayers to changes in tax rates
might be expected to lie.
III. Simulated Effect of Tax Reform Act of 1986
The behavioral models discussed above estimated the response
of taxpayers to changes in capital gains tax rates. In order to
place these results in the context of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, detailed simulation work was required. The results
presented here were developed using the National Bureau of—— 20——
EconomicResearch TAXSIM1 model. This computerized model,
like the Tax Calculator at the Department of Treasury, is based
on a detailed data base of actual tax returns. This paper
relied on the 1983 individual Tax Model File. This file
contains the detailed tax records of more than 90,000 taxpayers
for 1983. For cost reasons, a one in three random sample of the
file was used for the simulation. Due to the large size of the
original sample, the use of a one in three subsample has little
effect on the accuracy of the simulation results.
The income levels in the 1983 file were extrapolated to
later years based on actual and predicted economic conditions
for those years.2 The key variable to be extrapolated is the
level of capital gains. The results of Lindsey (1986) suggest
that, absent tax rate changes, capital gains realizations grow
in proportion to tradeable household wealth. As noted earlier,
this wealth is composed of household holdings of corporate
equities, real estate, and non—corporate equity. The 1984
levels of these assets provided by the Flow of Funds was
extrapolated to later years. Holdings of corporate equities
were extrapolated using the rise in the Standard and Poor's 500
Stock Index through the first quarter of 1987, and expanded at 8
percent per annum thereafter. Non—corporate equity was
extrapolated through 1986 using the rise in proprietary income
in the National Income and Product Accounts, and at an 8 percent
annual rate thereafter. Real estate holdings were extrapolated
assuming an 8 percent annual rate of growth.—— 21——
Theseextrapolated levels provide a baseline estimate of
what capital gains realizations would have been if thetax law
had remained unchanged since 1983.In fact, several changes in
the tax law have occurred since then. The net effect ofthese
changes has been quite small however. The weightedaverage
capital gains tax rate in 1986 was less than 0.1 percentage
point higher than the weighted average rate in 1983. The
baseline extrapolation was therefore used as the projection of
what capital gains tax revenues would have been under the old
tax law.
The TAXSIM program computed the capital gains tax rate for
each taxpayer under both old and new laws. These rates were
used to assign a new level of capital gains to each taxpayer
based on the behavioral assumptions discussed in the last
section. Taxpayers who did not realize capital gains under the
old law were assured not to realize capital gains under the new
law either.In the first set of simulations, taxpayers were
assumed to respond as if any change in their tax rate were
permanent. This is termed the "Steady State" level of
realizations because it shows what taxpayers would do if the
capital gains tax rate were held steady at the rate prevailing,
in the year of the si.ulation.
Table 3 presents the results of these simulations of the
Steady State level of capital gains realizations. The first row
shows the projected level of long term capital gains
realizations under the old tax law, or alternatively, the level
of capital gains realizations under the new law if taxpayers do—— 22——
Table3
Steady State Capital Gains Realizations
Behavioral Calendar Year
Assumption 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Baseline 152.9 177.5 192.3 209.2226.6245.6
Feldstein,Slemrod,
and Yitzhalci 37.4 37.6 39.9 43.1 46.4
Treasury 55.8 56.7 60.5 65.0 70.0
Lindsey 83.6 86.3 92.6 99.6 107.5
Auten -
Clotfelter 97.8 101.8 109.6 117.9127.4
Minarik
'1 116.6 122.7 132,4 142.7 154.3—— 23——
notrespond to the change in their capital gains tax rates.
The level of capital gains realizations under thenew tax law
given the assumptions of taxpayer behavior of the various
studies is provided in the rows following the baseline
extrapolation.
The simulation results all show substantial declines in the
level of capital gains realizations ——rangingfrom roughly one
third in the Minarik model to nearly four fifths in the
Feldstein, Slearod, and Yitzhaki model. These changes are so
dra.atic that it is useful to place them in an historical
context. The weighted average capital gains tax rate is rising
under the new law from roughly 15 percent to approximately 27
percent. This will be the largest tax rate change in history.
The •ost comparable change is from 1978 to 1979 when the
weighted average capital gains tax rate declined about 6
percentage points. Coinciding with that earlier rate change,
capital gains realizations rose from $48.6 billion to $70.5
billion, or 45 percent. If we assume symmetric taxpayer
behavior, a 6 percentage point rate increase would cut gains 30
percent. Two 6 percentage point rate increases would cut gains
roughly in half. That would imply a new level of capital gains
realizations in 1987 of about $89 billion and a 1988 level of
$96 billion. These estimates are roughly in the middle of the
capital gains estimates shown in Table 3.
The effect of these tax rate changes and the behavioral
response of taxpayers on capital gains tax revenue is presented
in Table 4. Again, taxpayer behavior is based on the assumption—- 24——
Table4
Steady State Capital Gains Tax Revenues
Behavioral Calendar Year
Assumption 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Baseline
OldLaw 21.70 25.40 27.6630.1632.84 35.77
Baseline
New Law 41.31 46.3450.94 55.5760.68
Feldstein ,Slemrod,
and Yitzhaki 7.27 7.37 7.92 8.60 9.36
Treasury 11.28 11.6112.54 13.58 14.78
Lindsey 17.69 18.5920.20 21.89 23.86
Auten -
Clotfelter 21.14 22.45 24.47 26.5228.93
Mlnarik 25.72 27.7430.31 32.91 35.90—— 25——
thatthe tax rate in a given year ispermanent. Two baseline
revenue estimates are presented, one for old law, one fornew
law. The old law baseline estimate is theexpected level of
capital gains tax revenue under pre—1986 tax law. Thenew law
baseline estimate is the level of capitalgains tax revenues
which would be expected if taxpayers ignored the rate increases
in making their realization decisions.
The figures show that under four of the five modelscapital
gains tax revenues under the new law will be lower than under
the old tax law.In the fifth model, based on Minarik's work,
capital gains tax revenues are virtually unchanged between old
law and new law.It is important to reiterate that these
figures are based on the behavioral responses to permanent tax
rate increases only. Thus, these results should be interpretted
as predicting a permanently lower (or virtually unchanged, in
the case of Minarik) level of capital gains tax revenue under
the new tax law.
It is also important to consider the distributional
ramifications of these tax rate changes. To illustrate this,
table 5 contrasts old law tax revenue with the tax revenue
collected under the two models which predict the highest level
of revenue under the new law. As the table shows, the effect of
the new tax law is to increase the share, and in some cases the
level, of taxes paid by lower income groups while cutting both
the share and the level of capital gains tax revenue paid by
upper income groups.—— 26——
Table5
Capital Gains Tax Revenue by Income Class: Selected Models
Income 1988 Capital Gains Tax Revenue
Class Old Law NewLaw Minarik NewLaw Aut—Clot.
under 10 8 107 72
10 —20 84 230 184
20 -30 329 638 540
30 —50 1007 1599 1295
50 —75 1272 1541 1186
75 —100 1136 1280 970
100 —200 3748 3707 2786
Over 200 20080 18640 15420
Total 27663 27738 22453
Revenue figures in thousands.—— 27——
TheTemporary Effects of Tax Rate Changes
The simulations presented thus far show the effects of the
behavioral response of taxpayers to steady state tax rate
changes. That is, they assume that taxpayers act as if any tax
rate they face will be permanent. Three of the econometric
studies of capital gains taxes indicated that a distinction
existed between taxpayer response to permanent tax rate changes
and temporary tax rate changes. All three of these studies:
Treasury, Lindsey, and Auten—Clotfelter, estimated the te.porary
effect retrospectively. That is, they assumed that the taxpayer
compared his current tax rate with his tax rates in the recent
past in deciding on the level of gains to realize.
This assumption of retrospective calculation of the
transitory component of tax rate changes fits well with the
theory of the "lock—in" effect. Under that theory, a sudden
reduction in capital gains tax rates would induce the taxpayer
to sell some assets which were not profitable to sell at the
earlier high tax rate. Thus, this model would predict that a
tax rate reduction would be accompanied by a sudden unlocking of
gains causing a temporary rise in realizations. After these
previously "locked—in" assets had been sold, realizations would
decline to a •ore normal level.
The application of this retrospective model to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 would predict that capital gains realizations
and capital gains tax revenue would fall further than the steady
state model predicted. This is due to the rise of tax rates in
1987 and 1988.In both of these years the current tax rate is—— 28——
wellabove the average of current and past tax rates inducing
taxpayers to lock up their capital gains more tightly. However,
it is not obvious that the temporary unlocking ofcapital gains
with a tax rate reduction has a reciprocal when tax rates
increase.
The rise in capital gains tax rates due to tax reformwas
known well in advance of the effective date of the tax increase.
Taxpayers in late 1986 therefore had the opportunity to realize
gains In anticipation that such gains would be subject to higher
taxes in the near future. A prospective model of temporary tax
rate changes therefore seems more appropriate than the
retrospective model. We include such a prospective model, using
the same transitory parameters as the retrospective model, in
estimating the effects of the tax law change. In this case, the
permanent rate is assumed to be the average of the current and
two future years' marginal tax rates.
The application of this prospective model of transitory tax
effects causes capital gains realizations to bunch in 1986.In
addition, the modest increases in tax rates under the new law
over the modelling period causes capital gains realizations to
be accelerated in each year.In effect, capital gains which
would have been realized in later years are permanently moved
forward,
careful interpretation of this prospective model is
required.it is, of course, impossible for taxpayers to realize
capital gains which have yet to occur. Rather, taxpayers who
know that their tax rates will be higher in the future will sell—— 29——
assetsnow that they otherwise would have sold in a later year.
The accelerated realizations in the current year should
therefore be reflected in lower realizations in lateryears. In
this model we did not include the effect of lower future capital
gains realizations to offset higher current realizations.
Therefore, the resulting estimates of realizations and revenues
in this model should be considered an upper bound on what the
actual levels would be if taxpayers respond to prospective
increases in capital gains tax rates.
A hybrid of the prospective and retrospective models is also
considered. This model defines the permanent tax rate as an
average of the current, past year's and next year's rates. The
effects of temporary acceleration of gains in the current year
shows up as a partially offsetting reduction of realizations in
the next year.
Converting Calendar Year Revenue into Fiscal Years
The revenue collections for each of these models is
presented in a fiscal year format in table 6. Capital gains
taxes for individuals, like all income taxes, accrue on a
calendar year basis. However. government accounting of the flow
of revenue is done on a fiscal year basis. The conversion from
calendar year accrual to fiscal year payment is done in two
steps. First, steady state revenues are computed for each
fiscal year by combining three—fourths of the current calendar
year revenue with one—fourth of the prior year's accrued
revenue. Second, deviations from steady state caused by
transitory effects are modelled as occurring at year end in the—— 30——
Table6
Fiscal Year Tax Revenue
Behavioral Fiscal Year
Assumption j9$7 1988 1989 1990 1991
Baseline
Old Law 24.48 27.1029.54 32.17 35.04
Feld,Slem,yit.
Steady State 10.88 7.34 7.78 8.43 9.17
Treasury
Steady State 13.8811.53 12.31 13.32 14.48
Treasury
Prospective 16.00 11.63 12.35 13.32 14.48
Treasury
Centered 14.85 11.17 12.32 13.32 14.48
Treasury
Retrospective 13.12 11.0812.30 13.32 14.48
Lindsey
Steady State 18.69 18.3619.80 21.47 23.37
Lindsey
Prospective 33.74 19.12 20.01 21.5823.37
Lindsey
Retrospective 12.65 18.04 19.8021.47 23.37
Auten—Clotfelter
Steady State 21.28 22.1223.96 26.01 28.33
Auten—Clotfelter
Prospective 41.67 23.34 24.28 26.01 28.33
Auten—Clotfelter
Centered 28.98 17.16 23.7326.03 28.32
Auten—Clotfelter
Retrospective 12,35 15.98 23.2825.87 28.29
Minarik
Steady State 24.72 27.2429.67 32.26 35.15—— 31——
prospectivemodel and at the beginning of the year in the
retrospective model.In effect, this assumes that the taxpayer
sells in December in anticipation of a tax rate increase, or
sells in January if a tax rate cut induces temporary unlocking.
The data in table 6 show the powerful effect that transitory
responses to tax rate changes may have on tax revenue. This is
particularly evident in the prospective models based on the
Lindsey and Auten—Clotfelter studies. In the case of Lindsey's
results, a prospective variant produces an additional $15
billion in fiscal 1987 due to added realizations in late 1986.
The prospective variant of the Auten—Clotfelter •odel produces
more than $20 billion more revenue in fiscal 1987 than does the
steady state version of the same model. The prospective version
of the Treasury model produces a •uch smaller $2.1 billion
increment above the steady state model. The reason for this is
that the elasticities with respect to permanent and transitory
changes are virtually identical in the Treasury model.
Conversely, the effect of retrospective modelling of
transitory effects shows the additional decline in revenue
caused by tax rates being higher than they were in the recent
past. The "Centered" models of the permanent and transitory tax
rate effects show the net effects of the prospective and
retrospective models.
The revenue implications for the 5 fiscal year period being
simulated shows that the Minarik model is the only set of
assumptions which will cause a revenue increase: a modest $0.7
billion. The next closest result is the prospective version of—— 32——
theAuten—Clotfelter model which shows a 5 year revenue loss of
a bit under $5 billion. Most of the models predict 5 year
revenue losses in excess of $20 billion. As the table clearly
shows, the reason that the 5 year revenue loss may be lower than
this is the possibility of greatly increased realizations in
fiscal 1987 (late 1986) in anticipation of future tax rate
increases. For example, in the prospective version of the
Auten—Clotfelter model, capital gains realizations in 1986 are
assumed to be more than twice their baseline level.
It is also important to note that all of the models predict
that the long run effect of the capital gains tax changes will
be lower (or flat in the case of Minarik) capital gains tax
revenue. Under none of the variants of any of the models could
we expect the long run result of the tax change to produce
substantially higher capital gains tax revenue.
In contrast, the revenue estimates released by the
Department of Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation
project large 5 year revenue increases. The Department of
Treasury projected3 a revenue increase of $12.5 billion in
fiscal 1987, decreases of $1.5 billion and $0.1 billion in
fiscal 1988 and fiscal 1989, an increase of $3.3 billion in
fiscal 1990 and $7.4 billion in fiscal 1991. The Joint
Committee on Taxation4 estimated the cost of reducing the top
marginal rate on capital gains to 20 percent under the Senate
bill as costing $7.8 billion in fiscal 1987, raising $12.7
billion and $0.2 billion in fiscal 1988 and fiscal 1989, and
losing $10.1 billion and $14.3 billion in fiscal 1990 and fiscal
1991.—— 33——
Neitherthe Treasury Department nor the Joint Committee
released the behavioral assumptions implicit in their models.
However, a contrast of these results with the results of the
other models indicates the kind of assumptions underlying the
Treasury and Joint Committee models. First, both assume some
prospective behavior on the part of taxpayers. This accounts
for the large gains in revenue in fiscal 1987 when rates are
increased and the large cuts in the JCT study of the effect of
tax reductions. The magnitudes of these changes are roughly one
third those estimated by the Lindsey and Auten—Clotfelter
prospective models.
Second, both Treasury and Joint Committee assume that any
tax rate effect is purely transitory in nature. This produces
large revenue gains in 1990 and 1991 when transitory effects are
likely to have worked themselves through the system. None of
the academic models studied echo this conclusion. Even in the
case of the Minarik model with its very modest elasticity, the
permanent effect of the tax rate change produced virtually no
additional tax revenue.
In conclusion, the prospects that the higher marginal tax
rates on capital gains in the new tax Law will produce •ore
capital gains tax revenue seem remote. In all models, the
response of gains to permanent tax rate changes produces a
smaller amount of revenue in four of the five models and static
revenue in the fifth. Higher capital gains tax revenue over the
5 fiscal year budget planning cycle will accrue only if very
substantial capital gains realizations occurred in late 1986 in—— 34——
anticipationof prospectively higher tax rates. Whether or not




The economists responsible for the development of the NBER
TAXSIM model are Daniel Feenberg, Martin Feldstein, Daniel
Frisch, Lawrence Lindsey, and Andrew Mitrusi.
2
A detailed description of the extrapolation procedure used
by TAXSIM can be found in Lindsey, "The response of taxpayers to
changes in tax rates 1982—1984 with implications for the revenue
maximizing tax rate.t' NBER Working Paper No. 2069.
These estimates were published in the Daily Economic Report,
January 29, 1987, pp.Jl-J13.
These estimates were provided in a letter from David
Brockway, Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to
Senator Alan Cranston, dated June 10,1986.—— 35
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